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Moreover, it examines the empirical validity of each of the theories and their signi￿cance for
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01 Introduction
The demographic transition has swept the world since the end of the nineteenth century. The
unprecedented increase in population growth during the Post-Malthusian Regime has been ulti-
mately reversed, bringing about signi￿cant reductions in fertility rates and population growth in
various regions of the world.
The demographic transition has enabled economies to convert a larger portion of the gains
from factor accumulation and technological progress into growth of income per capita. It enhanced
labor productivity and the growth process via three channels. First, the decline in population
growth reduced the dilution of the growing stocks of capital and infrastructure, increasing the
amount of resources per capita. Second, the reduction in fertility rates permitted the reallocation
of resources from the quantity of children toward their quality, enhancing human capital formation
and labor productivity. Third, the decline in fertility rates a⁄ected the age distribution of the
population, temporarily increasing the fraction of the labor force in the population and thus
mechanically increasing productivity per capita.
This paper examines various mechanisms that have been proposed as possible triggers
for the demographic transition and assesses their empirical signi￿cance in understanding the
transition from stagnation to growth. Was the onset of the fertility decline an outcome of the rise
in income during the course of industrialization? Was it triggered by the reduction in mortality
rates? Was it fueled by the rise in the relative wages of women? Or was it an outcome of the rise
in the demand for human capital in the second phase of industrialization?1
2 The Rise in the Level of Income Per Capita
The rise in income per capita prior to the decline in fertility has led some researchers to argue that
the reduction in fertility was triggered by the rise in income in the process of industrialization.
In particular, Becker (1960) advanced the argument that the decline in fertility was a by-product
of the rise in income and the associated rise in the opportunity cost of raising children. His
thesis suggests that the rise in income induced a fertility decline because the positive income
1The Princeton Project on the Decline of Fertility in Europe, carried out in the 1960s and 1970s, attempted
to characterize the decline of fertility in Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The project
suggests that social and economic forces played little role in the onset of fertility transition. The methodology used
in this research has been discredited over the years (e.g., Guinnane et al., 1994; Brown and Guinnane, 2007), and
economic forces are currently viewed as central to this transition.
1e⁄ect on fertility was dominated by a negative substitution e⁄ect brought about by the rising
opportunity cost of raising children. Similarly, Becker and Lewis (1973) postulated that the
income elasticity with respect to investment in children￿ s education was greater than that with
respect to the number of children, and hence the rise in income led to a decline in fertility along
with an increase in the investment in each child.
However, this preference-based theory is fragile from a theoretical viewpoint and unsat-
isfactory from an intellectual one. It hinges on the supposition that individuals￿preferences
re￿ ect an innate bias against child quantity beyond a certain level of income.2 Most critically, it
generates testable predictions that appear inconsistent with the evidence.
2.1 The Theory and its Testable Predictions
Consider a household that generates utility from consumption, c; and the number of (surviving)
children, n. The household is endowed with one unit of time and it generates an income, y; if its
entire unit of time is supplied to the labor market. Suppose that raising children is time intensive
and the entire cost associated with raising each child is a fraction ￿ of the parental unit-time
endowment.3
Hence, the household￿ s consumption equals the household￿ s labor income; that is, c =
(1 ￿ ￿n)y. Alternatively, the household￿ s budget constraint can be written in the conventional
form
￿yn + c ￿ y; (1)
where the price of a child is the opportunity cost associated with raising it, ￿y:4
A rise in the household￿ s earning capacity (per unit of time), y; generates two con￿ icting
e⁄ects. On the one hand, the increase in y generates a positive income e⁄ect, which operates
to increase the number of children (as long as children are viewed as a normal good). On the
other hand, the rise in y generates a negative substitution e⁄ect, which re￿ ects the increase in
the opportunity cost of raising a child, ￿y. If preferences are homothetic (i.e., preferences are
not inherently biased toward either consumption or children as income increases), the income
2One can attribute most changes in economic regimes to changes in the nature of preferences. However, since
preferences, as opposed to choices, are largely unobservable, theories that rely on changes in preferences are not
refutable.
3Alternatively, ￿y can be viewed as a monetary cost associated with raising each child by paying for a fraction
￿ of a caretaker￿ s time. The addition of nontime costs would not a⁄ect the qualitative insights.
4The price of consumption is normalized to 1.
2e⁄ect and substitution e⁄ect cancel one another. For instance, if the household￿ s preferences are
represented by a log-linear utility function, i.e.,5
u = ￿ lnn + (1 ￿ ￿)lnc; (2)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is a parameter; then the household￿ s optimal number of children is independent
of income;
n = ￿=￿: (3)
Thus, a priori, in contrast to the prediction of the Beckerian theory, the rise in income
may have no e⁄ect on the number of children. The Beckerian theory, therefore, is nonrobust, as
it rests on an implicit set of assumptions that assure that the substitution e⁄ect dominates as
income rises.
Nevertheless, independent of its theoretical fragility, one can examine the Beckerian theory
based on its testable predictions. If indeed the substitution e⁄ect dominates at su¢ ciently high
levels of income, then the theory suggests that the di⁄erential timing of the fertility decline
across countries (in similar stages of development) would re￿ ect di⁄erences in income per capita.
Furthermore, the level of fertility among individuals within a given economy would re￿ ect their
income levels.
Thus, the theory generates two major testable implications:
(i) Across countries that are similar in sociocultural characteristics (and thus in noneconomic
factors that may a⁄ect fertility decisions), the timing of the fertility decline is inversely
related to the level of income per capita.
(ii) Within an economy, the number of (surviving) children across households is inversely related
to their levels of income.
2.2 The Evidence
Remarkably, the theory appears counterfactual on both counts. As depicted in Figures 4.1 and
4.2, the decline in fertility occurred in the same decade across Western European countries that
di⁄ered signi￿cantly in their income per capita. In 1870, on the eve of the demographic transition,
5For simplicity, it is assumed that parents derive utility from the expected number of surviving o⁄spring and that
the parental cost of child rearing is associated only with surviving children. The introduction of costs associated
with nonsurviving children, or risk aversion, would not a⁄ect the qualitative features of the theory.
3England and the Netherlands were the richest countries in Western Europe, enjoying GDP per
capita of $3,190 and $2,760, respectively (Maddison, ?.6 In contrast, Germany and France, which
experienced the onset of a decline in fertility in the same decade as England and the Netherlands,
had in 1870 a signi￿cantly smaller GDP per capita of $1,840 and $1,880 respectively (i.e., only
about 60% of the level in England). Moreover, Sweden and Norway￿ s GDP per capita were only
about 40% of that of England in 1870, and Finland￿ s GDP per capita was merely a third of
the level in England. Nevertheless, the onset of the fertility decline in these poorer economies
occurred in the same decade as in England.7
The simultaneity of the demographic transition across Western European countries that
di⁄ered signi￿cantly in their incomes per capita suggests that the high levels of income reached
by these countries in the Post-Malthusian Regime played a very limited role, if any, in the onset
of the demographic transition, refuting the ￿rst testable implication of Beckerian theory.
Figure 1. The Demographic Transition Across Western Europe.
Data Sources: Chesnais (1992) and Maddison (2008):
Moreover, the evidence presented by Murtin (2009) (based on a panel of countries during
1870￿ 2000) shows that income per worker was positively associated with fertility rates, once
controls were introduced for mortality rates and education.
6GDP per capita was measured in 1990 international dollars.
7One could sensibly argue that the income thresholds at which the substitution e⁄ect dominates di⁄er across
this set of countries due to sociocultural and distributional factors. However, the likelihood that these di⁄erential
thresholds would be reached in the same decade across a large number of countries appears remote.
4Recent empirical examinations of the various factors that contributed to the demographic
transition within an economy also refute the second implication of the Beckerian theory. In
particular, cross-sectional evidence from France and England does not lend support to the theory.
Murphy (2009) ￿nds, based on panel data from France during 1876￿ 1896, that income per capita
had a positive e⁄ect on fertility rates during France￿ s demographic transition, accounting for
education, the gender literacy gap, and mortality rates. Moreover, a quantitative analysis of the
demographic transition in England, conducted by FernÆndez-Villaverde (2001), suggests that, in
contrast to the Beckerian theory, the force associated with a rise in income would have led to an
increase in fertility rates rather than to the observed decline in fertility.
3 The Decline in Infant and Child Mortality
The decline in infant and child mortality that preceded the reduction in fertility and population
growth in most advanced economies, with the notable exceptions of France and the United States,
has been viewed as a plausible explanation for the onset of the decline in population growth during
the demographic transition. Nevertheless, this hypothesis appears to be nonrobust theoretically
and inconsistent with historical evidence.
3.1 The Theory and its Testable Predictions
Consider a household that generates utility from consumption, c; and the number of surviving
children, n. Suppose that each child faces a probability ￿ of surviving infancy. Given the
(continuous) number of children that the household will bear, nb; the number of surviving children
is n = ￿nb: The household￿ s preferences are represented by log-linear utility function:8
u = ￿ lnn + (1 ￿ ￿)lnc; 0 < ￿ < 1: (4)
Moreover, the household is endowed with one unit of time, and it generates an income, y; if its
entire unit of time is supplied to the labor market.
Suppose that raising children is time intensive and the cost associated with raising each
surviving child is a fraction ￿ of the parental unit-time endowment, whereas the cost of raising a
8If the number of children is modeled as an integer rather than a continuous variable, then the maximization
problem would have to be modi￿ed to account for uncertainty (e.g., Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002). Nevertheless, the
qualitative prediction as outlined in this section would not be altered.
5nonsurviving child is 0: The household￿ s budget constraint is therefore
￿yn + c ￿ y; (5)
where the price of a surviving child is the opportunity cost associated with raising a child, ￿y:
The household￿ s optimal number of surviving children is therefore
n = ￿=￿; (6)
whereas the number of children born to the household, nb; is
nb = ￿=(￿￿): (7)
Hence, a decline in the child mortality rate, or equivalently an increase in the survival
probability of a child, ￿; mechanically reduces the level of household fertility, nb, but (in the
absence of uncertainty) has no e⁄ect on the number of surviving children, n.
The theory suggests that:
(a) Mortality rates have a positive e⁄ect on total fertility rates.
(b) Declines in mortality would not lead to a reduction in the number of surviving o⁄spring
unless the number of surviving children is uncertain and the following conditions are satis-
￿ed:
(i) There exists a precautionary demand for children (i.e., individuals are risk averse with
respect to the number of surviving o⁄spring and thus hold a bu⁄er stock of children
in a high-mortality environment).
(ii) Risk aversion with respect to consumption is not larger than risk aversion with respect
to the number of surviving children.9
(iii) Sequential fertility (i.e., replacement of nonsurviving children) is modest.
(iv) Parental resources saved from the reduction in the number of children that do not
survive to adulthood are not channeled toward childbearing.10
9In contrast, evolutionary forces would lead to the selection of preferences with higher risk aversion with respect
to consumption (Galor and Michalopoulos, 2006).
10Furthermore, if the physiological constraint on the feasible number of births per woman is binding for some
households under a high mortality regime, a reduction in mortality would operate to increase the number of
surviving o⁄spring.
63.2 The Evidence
While it is plausible that mortality rates were one of the factors that a⁄ected the level of fertility
throughout human history, historical evidence does not lend credence to the argument that the
decline in mortality accounts for the reversal of the positive historical trend between income and
fertility and for the decline in population growth (i.e., fertility net of mortality).
The decline in mortality in Western Europe started nearly a century prior to the decline in
fertility and was associated initially with increasing fertility rates in some countries. In particular,
as depicted in Figure 4.2, the decline in mortality started in England in the 1730s and was
accompanied by a steady increase in fertility rates until 1800. The sharp decline in fertility in
the course of the demographic transition occurred during a period in which income per capita
maintained its earlier positive trend, while mortality declines maintained the course that had
existed in the 140 years preceding the decline in fertility.11 The sharp reversal in the fertility
patterns in Western European countries in the 1870s, in the context of this stable pattern of
mortality decline, therefore, suggests that the demographic transition was prompted by a di⁄erent
universal force.
Figure 2. Mortality and Fertility across Western Europe, 1705-1925.
Data sources: Chesnais (1992); Maddison (2008).
Recent quantitative and empirical evidence supports the viewpoint that a decline in infant
11One could argue that the decline in mortality was not internalized into the decisions of households who had
di¢ culties separating a temporary decline from a permanent one. However, this argument is highly implausible,
given that mortality declined monotonically for nearly 140 years prior to the demographic transition. It is incon-
ceivable that six generations of households did not update information about mortality rates in their immediate
surroundings, keeping the collective memories about mortality rates prevalent more than a century earlier.
7mortality rates was not the trigger for the decline in net fertility during the demographic transi-
tion. Doepke (2005), using the mortality and fertility data from England during 1861￿ 1951, ￿nds
that in the absence of changes in other factors, the decline in child mortality during this time
should have resulted in a rise in net fertility rates, in contrast to the evidence. A similar conclu-
sion about the insigni￿cance of declining mortality for determining the decline in fertility during
the demographic transition is reached in the quantitative analysis of FernÆndez-Villaverde (2001).
Moreover, Murphy (2009) suggests, based on panel data from France during 1876￿ 1896, that the
mortality rate had no e⁄ect on fertility during France￿ s demographic transition, accounting for
education, income, and the gender literacy gap.12
Importantly, it is the reduction in net fertility and thus in population growth that is most
relevant from the viewpoint of the theory of economic growth. However, in light of the implausible
set of conditions that must be met for a decline in mortality rates to generate a decline in net
fertility, the observed sharp decline in the number of surviving o⁄spring (i.e., net reproduction
rate) during the demographic transition raises further doubts about the signi￿cance of mortality
declines in triggering the onset of the decline in population growth.13
4 The Rise in the Demand for Human Capital
The gradual rise in demand for human capital during the second phase of industrialization and its
close association with the timing of the demographic transition has led researchers to argue that
the increasing role of human capital in the production process induced households to increase
their investment in the human capital of their o⁄spring, leading to the onset of the fertility
decline.
Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) and Galor and Moav (2002) argue that the acceleration in the
rate of technological progress during the second phase of the Industrial Revolution increased the
demand for human capital and induced parents to invest more heavily in the human capital of
their o⁄spring.14 This increase in the rate of technological progress and the associated increase in
12In contrast, Eckstein et al. (1999)￿ s structural quantitative analysis of the demographic transition in Sweden
suggests that mortality decline played a role in the demographic transition. Their underlying theoretical structure
requires conditions (iii) and (iv) as well as speci￿c interactions among mortality, wages, and the return to human
capital.
13The evolution of fertility and mortality in less developed economies has been partly a⁄ected by policies advanced
by developed economies. A comprehensive overview of these patterns is provided by Schultz (1997).
14The e⁄ect of the rise in demand for human capital on parental choice of quality and quantity of o⁄spring is
discussed by Becker (1981). Becker et al. (1990) explore the role of luck in determination of the relative timing
of the demographic transition and thus the wealth of nations. As they argue on page S13, ￿Many attempts to
8parental income and demand for human capital brought about two e⁄ects on population growth.
On the one hand, the rise in income eased households￿budget constraints and provided more
resources for quality as well as quantity of children. On the other hand, it induced a reallocation
of these increased resources toward child quality. In the course of transition from the Malthusian
Epoch, the e⁄ect of technological progress on parental income dominated, and population growth
as well as the average population quality increased. Ultimately, further increases in the rate of
technological progress induced a reduction in fertility, generating a decline in population growth
and an increase in the average level of education.
Suppose that individuals generate utility from the quantity and the quality of their children
as well as from their own consumption. They choose the number of children and their quality
in the face of a constraint on the total amount of time that can be devoted to child-raising
and labor-market activities. A rise in parental income due to a rise in the demand for parental
human capital would generate, in contrast to Becker and Lewis (1973), con￿ icting income and
substitution e⁄ects that would not necessarily trigger a decline in fertility. However, the rise
in the future demand for the children￿ s human capital would lead to a pure substitution e⁄ect,
which would induce parents to substitute quality for quantity of children.
4.1 The Theory and Its Testable Predictions
Consider a household that generates utility from consumption, c; the number of (surviving)
children, n, and the human capital of each child, h: Suppose that preferences are represented by
a log-linear utility function15
u = (1 ￿ ￿)lnc + ￿[lnn + ￿ lnh]; (8)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 and 0 < ￿ < 1 are constant parameters.
explain why some countries have had the best economic performance in the past several centuries give too little
attention to accidents and good fortune.￿ In their theory a major shock shifts the economy from the basin of
attraction of a high-fertility to a low-fertility steady-state equilibrium, generating, counterfactually, a monotonic
decline in fertility rates along with a monotonic rise in income per capita. However, existing evidence shows that the
process of industrialization and the associated increase in income per capita were accompanied by a sharp increase
in population growth, prior to its decline during the course of the demographic transition. Moreover, although
they de￿ne the low output, high population growth steady state as a Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, it has
none of the features of a Malthusian equilibrium; population growth rate is not at the replacement level it is,
counterfactually, higher than that in the beginning of the demographic transition. Furthermore, a small positive
shock to income when the economy is in the ￿Malthusian￿steady state initially decreases fertility, in contrast to
the central aspect of Malthusian equilibrium.
15Once again, it is assumed that parents derive utility from the expected number of surviving o⁄spring and the
parental cost of child rearing is associated only with surviving children. The introduction of costs associated with
non-surviving children, or risk aversion, would not a⁄ect the qualitative features of the theory.
9Let ￿q + ￿ee be the time cost of raising a child with a level of education (quality) e.
That is, ￿q is the fraction of the household￿ s unit-time endowment that is required to raise a
child, regardless of quality, and ￿e is the fraction of the household￿ s unit-time endowment that is
required for each unit of education per child.
The household is endowed with one unit of time. It generates an income, y; if its entire unit
of time is supplied to the labor market. The household￿ s potential income, y, is divided between
expenditure on child rearing (quantity and quality) and consumption, c: The household￿ s budget
constraint is therefore
yn(￿q + ￿ee) + c ￿ y; (9)
where the price of a child is the opportunity cost associated with raising it, y(￿q + ￿ee):
Suppose that individuals￿level of human capital is determined by their quality (education)
as well as by the technological environment. Technological progress reduces the adaptability
of existing human capital to a new technological environment. Education, however, lessens the
adverse e⁄ects of technological progress. In particular, the time required for adaptation to a new
technological environment diminishes with the level of education and increases with the rate of
technological change.
Suppose that the level of human capital of each child; h; is an increasing, strictly concave
function of the parental time investment in the education of the child, e; and due to the obso-
lescence of human capital in a changing technological environment, a decreasing, strictly convex
function of the rate of technological progress, g.
h = h(e;g); (10)
where to assure an interior solution to the household￿ s optimization problem, it is further assumed
that lime!0 he(e;g) = 1, lime!1 he(e;g) = 0; and h(0;g) > 0 (i.e., individuals have a basic
level of human capital even in the absence of parental investment in quality).
Education lessens the obsolescence of human capital in a changing technological environ-
ment. That is, the marginal productivity of parental investment in a child￿ s human capital in-
creases in a more rapidly changing technological environment (i.e., heg(e;g) ￿ @[@h(e;g)=@e]=@g >
0):
The household￿ s optimization implies, therefore, that the optimal level of children, n; and
10their quality, e; are given by
n = ￿=(￿q + ￿ee);
￿eh(e;g) = ￿he(e;g)(￿q + ￿ee):
(11)








Proof. As follows from (11), the necessary condition for the household￿ s optimization with respect
to e is given by the implicit function
G(e;g;￿;￿q;￿e) ￿ ￿eh(e;g) ￿ ￿he(e;g)(￿q + ￿ee) = 0: (12)
As follows from the properties of h(e;g),
lime!0 G(e;g;￿;￿q;￿e) < 0;
lime!1 G(e;g;￿;￿q;￿e) > 0;
whereas, noting that 0 < ￿ < 1,
@G(e;g;￿q;￿e)
@e
= (1 ￿ ￿)￿ehe(e;g) ￿ ￿hee(e;g)(￿q + ￿ee) > 0: (13)
Hence, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists a unique, interior, value
of e such that e = e(g;￿;￿e;￿q):
Furthermore, noting that the strict concavity of h(e;g) in e implies that h(e;g)￿he(e;g)e >
0, it follows that
@G(e;g;￿q;￿e)
@g = ￿ehg(e;g) ￿ ￿heg(e;g)(￿q + ￿ee) < 0;
@G(e;g;￿q;￿e)
@￿ = ￿he(e;g)(￿q + ￿ee) < 0;
@G(e;g;￿q;￿e)
@￿q = ￿￿he(e;g)￿q < 0;
@G(e;g;￿q;￿e)



































@g < 0; @n
@￿ < 0; @n
@￿q < 0;
￿ @n
@￿e > 0 if [@e=@￿e][￿e=e] > ￿1:
Proof. As follows from (11), noting Lemma 1, the necessary condition for the household￿ s

























whereas if [@e=@￿e][￿e=e] < ￿1 (i.e., if the elasticity of child quality with respect to the cost of
child quality is greater than one in absolute value)
@n
@￿e = ￿
￿[e + ￿e @e
@￿e]





[￿q + ￿ee(g;￿;￿e;￿q)]2 > 0: (18)
￿
Hence, the optimal level of investment in child quality increases if:
(i) The technological environment changes more rapidly (i.e., @e(g;￿;￿e;￿q)=@g > 0);
(ii) Preferences for child quality are higher (i.e., @e(g;￿;￿e;￿q)=@￿ > 0);
(iii) The cost of raising a child (regardless of quality) increases (i.e., @e(g;￿;￿e;￿q)=@￿q > 0);
or
(iv) The cost of educating a child decreases (i.e., @e(g;￿;￿e;￿q)=@￿e < 0):
Similarly, the optimal number of children declines if:
(i) The technological environment changes more rapidly (i.e., @n=@g < 0);
12(ii) Preferences for child quality are higher (i.e., @n=@￿ < 0);
(iii) The cost of raising a child (regardless of quality) increases (i.e., @n=@￿q < 0); or
(iv) The cost of educating a child increases and the elasticity of child quality with respect
to the cost of child quality is smaller than one in absolute value (i.e., @n=@￿e < 0 if
[@e=@￿e][￿e=e] > ￿1):16
Thus, the theory generates several testable implications regarding the e⁄ect of a rise in
demand for education on the onset of the demographic transition:17
a. Across countries with similar sociocultural characteristics (and thus with similar non-economic
factors that may a⁄ect fertility decisions):
(i) The timing of the fertility decline is inversely related to the rate of technological
progress.
(ii) The level of fertility is inversely related to investment in education.
b. Within an economy:
(i) The level of fertility across households is inversely related to their level of investment
in education.
(ii) An increase in the preference for educated o⁄spring decreases fertility.
4.2 Evidence: Education and the Demographic Transition
Consistent with the theory, the growth rates of income per capita among Western European
countries were rather similar during their demographic transition, despite large di⁄erences in their
levels of income per capita. The average growth rate among northwestern European countries
16If the elasticity of child quality with respect to the cost of child quality is smaller than one (in absolute value),
an increase in the cost of education increases the overall investment in child quality and thus the number of children
declines. However, if the elasticity is greater than one, the number of children increases.
17In contrast to Becker and Lewis (1973), a rise in parental income (possibly due to a rise in the return to their
education) does not necessarily generate a substitution from child quantity to child quality. Instead, an increase in
the household￿ s earning capacity, y; due to the rise in the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor, generates two con￿ icting
e⁄ects. On the one hand, the rise in y also generates a positive income e⁄ect that operates to increase the number
of children. On the other hand, the rise in y generates a negative substitution e⁄ect that re￿ ects an increase in the
opportunity cost of raising a child, y[￿
q+￿
ee]. If preferences are homothetic, the income e⁄ect and the substitution
e⁄ect cancel each other. Then, the optimal number of children and their quality are independent of the parental
level of income.
13during this period was 1.3% per year ￿ranging from 1.0% per year in the United Kingdom, 1.3%
in Norway, 1.4% in Finland and France, 1.5% in Sweden, to 1.6% in Germany (Maddison, 2001).
Moreover, the adverse e⁄ect of an increase in productivity in the advanced stages of development
on net fertility has been established by Lehr (2009) using a pooled cross-sectional time series
sample during 1960￿ 1999, and by ? based on a sample of countries during the period 1900-1999.
Furthermore, evidence from a panel of countries during 1870￿ 2000 demonstrates that in-
vestment in education was indeed a dominating force in the decline in fertility. In particular,
educational attainment has been negatively associated with fertility, accounting for income per
worker and mortality rates (Murtin, 2009). Importantly, cross-sectional evidence from France,
Germany, and England supports the hypothesis that the rise in human capital formation has
had an adverse e⁄ect on fertility. Becker et al. (2009) ￿nd that education stimulated a decline
in fertility in Prussia during the nineteenth century.18 Similarly, Murphy (2009) ￿nds, based on
panel data from France during 1876￿ 1896, that the level of education attainment had an adverse
e⁄ect on fertility rates during France￿ s demographic transition, accounting for income per capita,
the gender literacy gap, and mortality rates.
As depicted in Figure 4.3, the decline in fertility in England was associated with a signi￿-
cant increase in the investment in child quality as re￿ ected by years of schooling. In particular,
Klemp and Weisdorf (2010) establish a causal e⁄ect of family sibship size on individual literacy
using demographic data for 26 English parishes during 1580￿ 1871. Exploiting exogenous vari-
ation in sibship size, stemmed from parental fecundity, they ￿nd that each additional sibling
reduces literacy among all family siblings. In addition, quantitative evidence provided by Doepke
(2004) suggests that educational policies aimed at promoting human capital formation played an
important role in the demographic transition in England.
A direct test of the e⁄ect on fertility of the rise in the return on human capital has been
conducted by Bleakley and Lange (2009) in the context of the eradication of hookworm disease
in the American South (circa 1910). Noting that the eradication of this disease can be viewed
as a positive shock to the return to child quality since (i) it raises the return on human capital
investment, (ii) it had a very low fatality rate, and (iii) it had negligible prevalence among adults,
they ￿nd that the rise in the return to child quality had a signi￿cant adverse e⁄ect on fertility
18They ￿nd that a lower cost of education, as proxied by lower land concentration, had an adverse e⁄ect on
fertility and education in the middle of the nineteenth century and on the extensiveness of the fertility decline
toward the end of the nineteenth century.
14rates.19
Figure 3. Investment in Human Capital and the Demographic Transition, England, 1730-1935.
Sources: Wrigley and Scho￿eld (1981); Flora et al. (1983).
Finally, the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse e⁄ect of increased preference for
educated o⁄spring on fertility rates is also supported by the empirical evidence (Becker et al.,
2009).
4.3 Evidence: Quantity-Quality Trade-o⁄ in the Post-Demographic Transi-
tion Period
Empirical examinations of the presence of a quantity-quality trade-o⁄in the contemporary period
do not directly re￿ ect on the importance of increased demand for education for the onset of the
demographic transition. Nevertheless, they may provide an additional perspective about the
mechanism as a whole.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), using the occurrence of multiple births as an exogenous
source of variation in quantity, con￿rm the hypothesis that an exogenous increase in fertility
decreases child quality. These ￿ndings were echoed by Hanushek (1992). Recently, however,
19Quantitative evidence provided by Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) is supportive of the role played by the rise
in the demand for skilled labor in the demographic transition in the US. They demonstrate that the faster pace
of technological progress in an industrial skilled-intensive sector as opposed to an unskilled-intensive agricultural
sector generates a demographic pattern that matches the data on the US demographic transition.
15Black et al. (2005) and Angrist et al. (2008) have used data on twins in Norway and Israel to
assess the impact of an exogenous increase in the number of children on measures of the quality
of nontwins. They have found little evidence of an adverse e⁄ect on the quality of nontwins.20
In contrast, employing a similar methodology, Li et al. (2008) ￿nd a signi￿cant quantity-quality
trade-o⁄ in rural China and weaker e⁄ects in urban areas. However, as asserted by Rosenzweig
and Zhang (2009), since these studies ignore the impact on the quality of the twins themselves,
it is essential to assess whether the closer spacing of twins and their inferior endowments a⁄ect
investments in nontwins in the family and obscure the quantity-quality trade-o⁄. Rosenzweig
and Zhang (2009) ￿nd that parents do provide more human capital resources to children with
higher endowments (i.e., nontwin children).
Furthermore, as elaborated in the derivation of the theory, an ideal test of the presence
of a quantity-quality trade-o⁄ requires a change in the relative price of quantity or a change
in the return to quality. In contrast, the e⁄ect of a change in an endogenous variable (i.e.,
quantity of children) requires a careful examination of the adjustment made by the household
due to the exogenously imposed nonoptimal choice of quantity. The theory suggests that in
su¢ ciently wealthy societies where intergenerational transfers take place (e.g., Israel and Norway)
an unexpected birth is more likely to reduce future intergenerational transfers to the child as
opposed to reducing child quality. The optimal level of investment in child quality, as other forms
of investment, re￿ ects the return on this investment. If a nonoptimal choice of quantity of children
is imposed on the household (due to an unexpected birth of a child), it is not necessarily optimal
for the household to reduce child quality. Instead, optimality would necessitate adjustments in
other margins (intergenerational transfers or parental consumption). In particular, if parents
intend to transfer income to their children in the future, the optimal investment in child quality
equates the rate of return on investment in human capital to the rate of return on investment
in physical capital (which is constant from the viewpoint of the individual). A shock to the
quantity of children would generate an adjustment in the household￿ s optimization. As such, a
reduction in investment in child quality would be suboptimal since it would result in a higher rate
of return on investment in human capital than on physical capital.21 The optimal adjustment
20Signi￿cant child allowances in these countries may mitigate the adverse e⁄ect on child quality and may therefore
obscure the adverse e⁄ect of quantity on quality.
21See Galor and Moav (2004) for the optimal allocation of intergenerational transfers between investment in
human capital and the transfer of physical capital.
16would be a reduction in intergenerational transfers, leaving investment in child quality intact.
Thus, although a quantity-quality trade-o⁄ may exist (i.e., an increase in the relative price of
the quantity of children or the return to quality decreases the number of children and increases
investment in each child), an exogenous change in child quantity does not a⁄ect child quality.
The ￿ndings of Black et al. (2005) and Angrist et al. (2008) thus have limited bearing on the
presence or absence of a quantity-quality trade-o⁄.
5 The Rise in the Demand for Human Capital: Reinforcing
Mechanisms
The onset of the demographic transition is traced by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and
Moav (2002) to the rise in the demand for human capital and the incentive that it provides
parents to substitute quality for quantity of children. This link has been reinforced by various
complementary mechanisms.
5.1 The Decline in Child Labor
Improvements in health infrastructure and the rise in life expectancy may have reinforced the
impact of increased demand for human capital on the decline in the desired number of surviving
o⁄spring.22 Despite gradual improvements in the health environment and in life expectancy prior
to the demographic transition, investment in human capital was rather insigni￿cant as long as
technological demand for human capital was limited. However, in light of the technologically
based rise in demand for human capital during the second phase of the Industrial Revolution,
the e⁄ect of health on the productivity of workers and pupils has increased the potential rate of
return on investments in children￿ s human capital and thus has reinforced and complemented the
incentive to invest in education and its associated e⁄ect on fertility rates.23
22Hazan (2009) has argued that the lengthening of life expectancy toward the end of the nineteenth century
had no e⁄ect on the length of working life and thus could not be viewed as an incentive for investment in human
capital. However, as established by Sheshinski (2009), when survival probabilities rise at all ages, behavioral
response depends on changes in the hazard rate. An increase in life expectancy may lead to higher investment in
education. Moreover, the increase in the health of children enhanced their productivity in human capital formation
and thus increased the relative return to investment in child quality (Hazan and Zoabi, 2006).
23Young (2005) argues that a widespread community infection (i.e., the AIDS epidemic in Africa) lowers fertility,
both directly, through a reduction in the willingness to engage in unprotected sexual activity, and indirectly, by
increasing the scarcity of labor and the value of a woman￿ s time.
175.2 The Rise in Life Expectancy
The improvements in health infrastructure and the rise in life expectancy may have reinforced
the impact of an increase in the demand for human capital on the decline in the desired num-
ber of surviving o⁄spring.24 Despite gradual improvements in the health environment and in
life expectancy prior to the demographic transition, investment in human capital was rather in-
signi￿cant as long as technological demand for human capital was limited. However, in light of
the technologically-based rise in the demand for human capital during the second phase of the
Industrial Revolution, the e⁄ect of health on the productivity of workers and pupils has increased
the potential rate of return to investments in children￿ s human capital and thus has reinforced
and complemented the incentive to invest in education and its associated e⁄ect on fertility rates.
5.3 Globalization
Galor and Mountford (2006) and Galor and Mountford (2008) argue that international trade
contributed to the divergence in the timing of the demographic transition and the emergence of
sustained economic growth across countries. The expansion of international trade enhanced the
specialization of industrial economies in the production of industrial, skill-intensive, goods. The
associated rise in the demand for skilled labor has induced a gradual investment in the quality
of the population, expediting a demographic transition, stimulating technological progress and
further enhancing the comparative advantage of these industrial economies in the production of
skill-intensive goods. In non-industrial economies, in contrast, international trade has generated
an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled-intensive, non-industrial, goods. The
absence of signi￿cant demand for human capital has provided limited incentives to invest in the
quality of the population and a larger share of their gains from trade has been utilized for a further
increase in the size of the population, rather than in the income of the existing population. The
demographic transition in these non-industrial economies has been signi￿cantly delayed, increas-
ing further their relative abundance of unskilled labor, enhancing their comparative disadvantage
in the production of skill-intensive goods, and delaying their process of development.
24Hazan (2009) has argued that the lengthening of life expectancy towards the end of the 19th century had no
e⁄ect on the length of the working life and thus could not be viewed as an incentive for investment in human capital.
However, the associated increase in students health enhanced their productivity in human capital formation and
thus, increased the relative return to child quality (Hazan and Zoabi (2006)).
185.3.1 Anecdotal Evidence
The contrasting process of development of the United Kingdom and India over the 19th and
the 20th centuries is consistent with the proposed theory and provides an interesting case study.
During the nineteenth century the United Kingdom traded manufactured goods for primary
products with India. Per capita industrialization in India signi￿cantly regressed over this century
whereas per capita industrialization in the UK accelerated. The process of industrialization in the
United Kingdom lead to a signi￿cant increase in the demand for skilled labor in the second phase
of the industrial revolution, triggering a demographic transition in the 1870s and a transition to
a state of sustained economic growth. In India, in contrast, the lack of demand for skilled labor
delayed the demographic transition and the transition to a sustained-growth regime to the second
half of the twentieth century.
Another interesting case study providing supporting evidence for the proposed hypothesis is
the economic integration of the Israeli and the West Bank economies in the aftermath of the 1967
war. Trade and factor mobility between the skilled abundant economy of Israel and the unskilled
abundant economy of the West Bank shifted the West Bank economy toward further specialization
in the production of primary goods, and triggered an astonishing increase in crude births rates
from 22 per 1000 people in 1968 to 42 per 1000 in 1990, despite a decline in mortality rates. Thus,
the gains from trade and development in the West Bank economy were partly converted into an
increase in population size, nearly doubling the population in about two decades. Consistent
with the proposed theory, the Palestinian uprising in the early 1990s and the gradual separation
of the two economies resulted in the reduction in the crude birth rates among the Palestinian
population.
5.3.2 Empirical Examination
Galor and Mountford (2008) use cross-country regression analysis to examine empirically the
hypothesis that the e⁄ect of international trade on the demand for human capital induces a rise
in fertility and a decline in human capital formation in non-industrial economies, and a decline in
fertility and a rise in human capital formation in industrialized economies. The evidence suggests
that indeed international trade has reinforced the initial patterns of comparative advantage and
has generated a persistent e⁄ect on the distribution of population in the world economy.
The empirical analysis focuses on a recent time period in which most countries have already
19experienced their demographic transition. In particular, it examines the e⁄ect of the share of
trade in GDP in 1985 on Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and on the change in the average years
of schooling in industrial and non-industrial economies over the time period 1985￿ 1990. The
choice of this time period re￿ ects the desirability of the use of the Frankel and Romer (1999)
instrument for a country￿ s intrinsic propensity to trade in 1985, so as to overcome the potential
existence of omitted variables, measurement errors, and reverse causality from fertility and human
capital formation to trade patterns. Furthermore, in the absence of authoritative data on the
factor content of trade that would have enabled the division of the world into economies which
export human capital intensive goods and those which export unskilled labor intensive goods,
the hypothesis is tested on a pre-existing division of the world economy, and considers OECD
economies in 1985 as those which export on average human capital intensive goods and non-OECD
economies in 1985 as those which export unskilled-intensive goods.
The theory suggests that international trade, via its e⁄ect on the patterns of specialization,
would increase the demand for human capital in the OECD economies and decrease the demand
for human capital in non-OECD economies. This would generate a force toward a decline in
fertility rates and an increase in human capital investment in OECD economies and toward a
rise in fertility rates and a decline in human capital investment in non-OECD economies. In
addition, however, the gains from international trade, would be expected to generate a rise in
income in both OECD and non-OECD countries. In the pre-demographic transition era these
gains in income would be channeled toward an increase in fertility rates. The e⁄ect of the rise
in income would therefore enhance the increase in fertility rates in less developed economies and
would o⁄set some of the negative e⁄ect of the rise in the demand for human capital on fertility
in developed economies.
However, in the post-demographic transition era, which is the time period that characterizes
our data, the rise in income due to international trade generates, at the parental level, con￿ icting
income and substitution e⁄ects with respect to the optimal number of children and their quality.
Although, according to the theory, these e⁄ects o⁄set one another, the rise in households￿income
increases the relative demand for human capital intensive goods and generates a force toward a
decline in fertility and a rise in human capital investment in non-OECD economies as well as in
OECD economies that have not reached their balanced growth path.
Thus, in the post-demographic transition era, the overall e⁄ect of international trade on
20fertility in OECD economies would be expected to be negative, whereas the overall e⁄ect of trade
on fertility in non-OECD economies is a⁄ected by two con￿ icting forces. Controlling for income,
however, the e⁄ect of trade on fertility is predicted to be positive in non-OECD economies and
negative in OECD economies. Similarly, controlling for income, the e⁄ect of trade on human
capital formation is predicted to be negative in non-OECD economies and positive in OECD
economies. Furthermore, some of the variation in fertility rates across countries would re￿ ect
variation in infant mortality rates. As long as parents generate utility from the number of
surviving children, the theory predicts that infant mortality rates have a positive e⁄ect on fertility
rates in both OECD and non-OECD economies.
The cross-country regression analysis supports the hypothesis that international trade gen-
erates opposing e⁄ects on fertility rates and education in developed and less developed economies.
As depicted in Figures 4, international trade has a positive e⁄ect on fertility in non-OECD
economies and negative e⁄ect in OECD economies. Similarly, as established by Galor and Mount-
ford (2008) international trade has a negative e⁄ect on human capital formation in non-OECD
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Figure 4. The E⁄ect of Trade on Fertility in OECD and non-OECD Economies.
Summary ￿The ￿gure depicts the partial regression line for the e⁄ect of trade share in GDP in 1985 on Total
Fertility Rate in the period 1985￿ 1990 in Non-OECD (top panel) and OECD economies (bottom panel) while
controlling for log GDP per capita and infant mortality rate in 1985.
225.4 Evolution of Preferences for O⁄spring￿ s Quality
The impact of the increased demand for human capital on the decline in the desired number of
surviving o⁄spring may have been magni￿ed by the evolution of preferences toward child quality.
These evolutionary processes conceivably have been driven by cultural and religious movements
as well as by the forces of natural selection.
Galor and Moav (2002) propose that during the Malthusian Epoch individuals with a higher
valuation of o⁄spring quality gained an evolutionary advantage and their representation in the
population gradually increased. They argue that the agricultural revolution facilitated division
of labor, which fostered trade relationships among individuals and communities. It enhanced
the complexity of human interaction and raised the return on human capital. The prevalence
of preferences for child quality in the population lagged behind the evolutionarily optimal level,
and individuals with traits of higher valuation of o⁄spring quality generated higher income and,
in the Malthusian Epoch (when income had a positive e⁄ect on fertility), a larger number of
o⁄spring.25 Thus, the Malthusian pressure gradually increased the proportion of individuals
whose preferences were biased toward child quality. This evolutionary process was reinforced by
its interaction with economic forces. As the fraction of individuals with high valuation of quality
increased, technological progress intensi￿ed, raising further the demand for human capital. The
increase in the rate of return on human capital along with the increase in the bias toward quality
in the population reinforced the substitution toward child quality, setting the stage for a more
rapid decline in fertility and a signi￿cant increase in the investment in human capital.
Religious movements (e.g., Judaism [(Botticini and Eckstein, 2005)] and Protestantism
[(Becker and Woessmann, 2009)]) and the Age of Enlightenment have also contributed to the
demographic transition through their e⁄ects on preferences for education. In particular, as es-
tablished empirically by Becker et al. (2009), a rise in preferences for education (proxied by
concentric di⁄usion of Protestantism in Prussia around Luther￿ s city of Wittenberg) had an
adverse e⁄ect on fertility rates during the middle of the nineteenth century in Prussia.
25As long as the bias toward child quality is moderate, the additional income generated dominates that bias
toward quality and allows for a higher reproduction success rate.
236 The Decline in the Gender Gap
The rise in demand for human capital and its impact on the decline in the gender wage gap during
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries have contributed to the onset of the demographic
transition. In particular, the rise in women￿ s relative wages during the process of development,
its positive impact on female labor force participation, and its adverse e⁄ect on fertility rates
have been at the center of a complementary theory of the demographic transition that generates
the observed hump-shaped relationship between income per capita and population growth.
A pattern of rising relative wages for women and declining fertility rates has been observed
in a large number of developed and less developed economies. In particular, as depicted in Figure
4.4, this pattern was observed in the United States during 1800￿ 1940.26
Figure 5. Female Relative Wages and Fertility Rates: United States 1800￿ 1990.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) and Hernandez (2000).
In addition, the process of development has been associated with a gradual decline in
the gender gap in human capital formation. As depicted in Figure 4.5, the literacy rate among
women in England, which was only 76% of that of men in 1840, grew rapidly during the nineteenth
century and reached the male level in 1900.
26For an extensive analysis of the pattern of fertility in the United States during 1826￿ 1960, see Greenwood et al.
(2005) and Jones and Tertilt (2006).
24Figure 6. The Decline in the Human Capital Gap between Male and Female: England 1840-1900.
Source: Cipolla (1969).
6.1 The Theory and its Testable Predictions
The role that the decline in the gender wage gap played in the onset of the demographic transition
has been examined by Galor and Weil (1996). They argue that technological progress and capital
accumulation in the process of industrialization increased the relative wages of women and trig-
gered the onset of the demographic transition. They maintain that technological progress, along
with physical capital accumulation, complemented mentally-intensive tasks more than physically-
intensive tasks in the production process, raising the return to brain relative to brawn. Thus,
in light of the comparative physiological advantage of men in physically intensive tasks and of
women in mentally intensive tasks, the demand for women￿ s labor gradually increased in the
industrial sector, decreasing the gender wage gap.
In the early stages of industrialization, as long as the rise in women￿ s wages was insu¢ -
cient to induce a signi￿cant increase in women￿ s labor force participation, fertility increased due
to the income e⁄ect generated by the rise in men￿ s wages in the increasingly more productive
industrial sector. Ultimately, however, the rise in women￿ s relative wages was su¢ cient to in-
duce a signi￿cant increase in their labor force participation. This process increased the cost of
25child rearing proportionately more than the increase in household￿ s income, triggering a fertility
decline. Moreover, the rise in demand for human capital in the process of development induced
a gradual improvement in women￿ s education. It raised the opportunity cost of raising children
more than the increase in household income, and reinforced the fertility decline and the rise in
female labor force participation.27 .
Consider households that generate utility from consumption, c; and the number of (surviv-
ing) children, n. Each household consists of a man and a woman. The man￿ s wage is wM and
the woman￿ s wage is wF (if they devote their entire time for labor force participation). Suppose
that only women raise children and the cost associated with raising each child is a fraction ￿ of
a woman￿ s time endowment. Hence, the household￿ s budget constraint is
￿wFn + c ￿ wF + wM; (19)
where the price of a child is the opportunity cost associated with raising a child, ￿wF:
Hence, a rise in the wages of women, wF; generates two con￿ icting e⁄ects. On the one
hand, the rise in wF generates a positive income e⁄ect that operates to increase the number of
children (as long as children are viewed as a normal good). On the other hand, the rise in wF
generates a negative substitution e⁄ect that re￿ ects the increase in the opportunity cost of raising
children, ￿wF. If preferences are homothetic, then the substitution e⁄ect necessarily dominates,
since an increase in wF increases the opportunity cost of raising children proportionately more
than the household￿ s income. Fertility therefore declines and women￿ s labor force participation
increases.
Thus, unlike the single-parent model in which an increase in income generates con￿ icting
income and substitution e⁄ects that cancel one another if preferences are homothetic, in the
two-parent household model, if most of the burden of child rearing is placed on women, a rise in
women￿ s relative wages increases the opportunity cost of raising children more than household
income, generating a pressure to reduce fertility.
6.2 The Evidence
The role of the decline in the gender wage gap in the demographic transition is supported empir-
ically. Schultz (1985) ￿nds that an increase in the relative wages of women played an important
role in Sweden￿ s fertility transition, and Murphy (2009) suggests, based on panel data from
27See also Goldin (1990) and Lagerl￿f (2003).
26France during 1876￿ 1896, that a reduction in the gender literacy gap had an adverse e⁄ect on
fertility during France￿ s demographic transition, accounting for income per capita, educational
attainment, and mortality rates.28
7 The Old-Age Security Hypothesis
The old-age security hypothesis has been proposed as an additional mechanism for the onset
of the demographic transition. It suggests that in the absence of capital markets which permit
intertemporal lending and borrowing, children serve as an asset that permit parents to transfer
income to old age.29 Hence, the establishment of capital markets in the process of development
reduced this motivation for rearing children, contributing to the demographic transition.
Although old-age support is a plausible element that may a⁄ect the level of fertility, it
appears as a minor force in the context of the demographic transition. First, since there are
only rare examples in nature of o⁄spring that support their parents in old age, it appears that
old-age support cannot be the prime motivation for child rearing. Second, institutions supporting
individuals in their old age were formed well before the demographic transition. For instance,
evidence suggests that, as early as the sixteenth century, parents in England did not rely on
support from children in their old age (Pelling and Smith, 1991; Hindle, 2004). In particular, the
Poor Law Act of 1601 was interpreted by the English courts as giving the impoverished parent no
claims for assistance from a child, but instead a claim for assistance from the community (Pelling
and Smith, 1991).
The rise in fertility rates prior to the demographic transition, in a period of improvements
in credit markets, raises further doubts about the signi￿cance of this mechanism. Moreover,
cross-sectional evidence shows that in the pre-demographic transition era wealthier individuals,
who presumably had better access to credit markets, had a larger number of surviving o⁄spring,
increasing the skepticism about the importance of this hypothesis.30 Thus the decline in the
importance of old-age support is unlikely to be a major force behind the signi￿cant reduction in
fertility ￿at a rate of 30￿ 50% ￿that occurred during the demographic transition.
28In the contemporary era, Heckman and Walker (1990) ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of women￿ s wages and a positive
e⁄ect of men￿ s income on birth rates.
29See Neher (1971) and Caldwell (1976) for earlier studies and Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a recent quantitative
analysis.
30It should be noted, however, that if the wealth of the rich is based on nonwage income, it would be associated
with a pure income e⁄ect, which could result in higher fertility rates, despite a reduced need for old-age support.
278 The Demographic Transition and the Origins of Modern Growth
Uni￿ed Growth Theory (Galor and Weil, 1999, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Galor and Mount-
ford, 2008; Galor, 2005, 2010) suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth is an
inevitable by-product of the process of development. It argues that the inherent Malthusian
interaction between the rate of technological progress and the size and the composition of the
population accelerated the pace of technological progress and ultimately raised the importance
of human capital in the rapidly changing technological environment. The rise in the demand for
human capital and its impact on human capital formation triggered a reduction in fertility rates
and population growth and further technological advances.31 The demographic transition has
enabled economies to divert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological
progress from fueling population growth toward the enhancement of human capital formation
and income per capita, thus paving the way for the emergence of sustained economic growth.
Thus, Uni￿ed Growth Theory suggests that the demographic transition played an impor-
tant role in the emergence of modern growth. Indeed, cross-country evidence, depicted in Figure
7, shows that contemporary income per capita and education are signi￿cantly and positively
associated with the time elapsed since the demographic transition.
31Clearly, the increased demand for human capital has not necessarily resulted in an increase in the rate of
return to human capital due to institutional changes (e.g., the provision of public education) that lowered the cost
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Figure 7. Education and Income Per Capita in 2000 and its association with
Time Elapsed since the Demographic Transition.32
Summary ￿The ￿gure depicts the partial regression line for the e⁄ect of the years elapsed since the demographic
transition on income per capita in the year 2000 (top panel), and average years of education in the year 2000
(bottom panel) while controlling for the absolute latitude, and continental ￿xed e⁄ects.
32The data on the time elapsed since the demographic transition is derived from Reher (2004).
299 Concluding Remarks
The old-age security hypothesis has been proposed as an additional mechanism for the onset
of the demographic transition. It suggests that in the absence of capital markets which permit
intertemporal lending and borrowing, children serve as an asset that permit parents to transfer
income to old age.33 Hence, the establishment of capital markets in the process of development
reduced this motivation for rearing children, contributing to the demographic transition.
Although old-age support is a plausible element that may a⁄ect the level of fertility, it
appears as a minor force in the context of the demographic transition. First, since there are
only rare examples in nature of o⁄spring that support their parents in old age, it appears that
old-age support cannot be the prime motivation for child rearing. Second, institutions supporting
individuals in their old age were formed well before the demographic transition. For instance,
evidence suggests that, as early as the sixteenth century, parents in England did not rely on
support from children in their old age (Pelling and Smith, 1991; Hindle, 2004). In particular, the
Poor Law Act of 1601 was interpreted by the English courts as giving the impoverished parent no
claims for assistance from a child, but instead a claim for assistance from the community (Pelling
and Smith, 1991).
The rise in fertility rates prior to the demographic transition, in a period of improvements
in credit markets, raises further doubts about the signi￿cance of this mechanism. Moreover,
cross-sectional evidence shows that in the pre-demographic transition era wealthier individuals,
who presumably had better access to credit markets, had a larger number of surviving o⁄spring,
increasing the skepticism about the importance of this hypothesis.34 Thus the decline in the
importance of old-age support is unlikely to be a major force behind the signi￿cant reduction in
fertility ￿at a rate of 30￿ 50% ￿that occurred during the demographic transition.
33See Neher (1971) and Caldwell (1976) for earlier studies and Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a recent quantitative
analysis.
34It should be noted, however, that if the wealth of the rich is based on nonwage income, it would be associated
with a pure income e⁄ect, which could result in higher fertility rates, despite a reduced need for old-age support.
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